We explore the impact of mortgage securitization on the international diversi…cation of macroeconomic risk. By making mortgage-related risks internationally tradeable, securitization contributes considerably to better international consumption risk sharing: we …nd that countries with the most highly developed markets for securitized mortgage debt have consumption responses to a typical idiosyncratic business cycle shock that are 20-30 percent less volatile than those experienced by countries that do not allow for mortgage securitization. Our results are based on quarterly data from a panel of 16 industrialized countries and cover the sample period 1971-2008Q1. They are robust to a range of controls for other aspects of …nancial globalization, international di¤erences in the structure of housing markets and the …nancial system etc. Against the backdrop of the subprime crisis, these …ndings inevitably raise the question whether securitization could not just facilitate risk sharing in tranquil times but that it actually fails to provide international insurance in severe crisis periods. Indeed, we …nd that international risk sharing decreases in global asset price downturns and increases in booms. But we do not …nd evidence that countries with more developed securitization markets are systematically more exposed to these ‡uctuations in the extent to which risk can be shared across national boundaries.
Introduction
The securitization of mortage-related debt has played a major role in the emergence and proliferation of the current …nancial crisis (see Brunnermeier (2008) for a detailed account). Understandably, this has led to widespread scepticism with respect to the usefulness of such instruments for an e¢ cient allocation of macroeconomic risk. From the current experience it seems obvious that the repackaging of mortgage debt in mortgage backed securities (MBS) can have enormous aggregate costs, but to date no empirical account of the macroeconomic bene…ts of these instruments exists.
In this paper we contribute to …lling this gap by exploring the impact that the increasing use of mortgage securitization has had on the international diversi…cation of macroeconomic risk. From a theoretical point of view, one may expect that the impact of mortgage securitization could be large. Mortgage markets are internationally far less integrated than say equity or bond markets. Residential real estate is largely domestically …-nanced in most economies, making ‡uctuations in the value of housing and the quality of mortgage debt a major background risk from the perspective of an individual country. That the idiosyncratic component of such risks is likely to be signi…cant is illustrated in …gure (1) , which plots the international correlation of stock markets agains that of residential housing prices:
housing prices generally have much lower international correlations, implying the ‡uctuations in the value of residential real estate (or of the debt collateralized on it) are a signi…cant idiosyncratic risk from the perspective of the individual economy. Securitization can help diversify such risks internationally because it makes mortgage-debt internationally tradeable.
Our evidence strongly supports this theoretical conjecture: we …nd that over the last 20 years, the increasing securitization of mortgage debt has contributed considerably to better international consumption risk sharing.
The e¤ect is large: the countries with the most highly developed markets for mortgage backed securities have consumption volatilities in response to a typical idiosyncratic business cycle shock that are 20-30 percent lower than experienced by countries that do not allow for securitization. These results are robust to a range of controls for other aspects of …nancial globalization, international di¤erences in the structure of housing markets and the …nancial system etc.
If securitization carries bene…ts in terms of better international risk sharing, this inevitably raises the question whether the costs in ‡icted by a major downturn such as the current one could not still outweigh the potential welfare bene…ts of better international risk sharing by an order of magnitude.
Securitization may well facilitate risk sharing in tranquil times, but it might actually make things worse in a crisis. We attempt to provide a quantitative impression of this trade-o¤ by asking to what extent international risk sharing is dependent on the state of global asset markets. Indeed, we …nd that international risk sharing increases in asset price booms and decreases in recessions. At least based on previous episodes, we do not …nd evidence that the ability to share risk across national boundaries is generally more dependent on global asset market conditions in countries with high levels of securitization than in countries where no secondary markets for mortgagedebt exist. Our (macroeconomic) data set covers the period from 1971 to the …rst quarter of 2008. Hence, it includes the onset of the current turmoil but does not yet cover the further unfolding of events, including the demise of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The judgement on the role of securitization for international transmission and risk sharing in the current crisis is necessarily bound to remain out for now and we therefore do not attempt to say anything on it here. We note, however, that recent events are certainly in line with the view that securitization has contributed to turning this crisis into the …rst globalized real estate bust. The fact that the costs of the crisis are spread internationally -for better or worse -indicates that markets for securitized mortgage credit do seem to provide international risk sharing. Very few papers have recognized the possibility that the extent of risk sharing might vary over the economic cycle or with asset prices. We explore this possibility here. In this respect we build on Ho¤mann and Shcherbakova (2008) and van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2006) . Ho¤mann and Shcherbakova (2008) show that interstate risk sharing in the U.S. increases in booms and decreases in recessions. This cyclical dependence has, however, been mitigated as a consequence of the liberalization of interstate banking markets during the 1980s. Here we adapt the empirical framework of this previous study to explore the role that asset prices play for risk sharing among countries. Another closely related paper is Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006) who explore the role of time variation in collateral availability for interstate risk sharing.
The paper is now structured as follows. In the next section, we present our empirical framework. Section three presents our data set. Section four presents the bulk of our empirical results. Section …ve summarizes and concludes.
International Risk Sharing and the securitization of mortgage debt
We measure consumption risk sharing through panel regressions of the form
where C k t is per capita consumption in country k in period t, GDP k t is the country's output per head and the asterisk denotes the international per capita average of the respective variable. In such a regression, we can think of the estimate of u as measuring the amount of uninsured idiosyncratic output risk.
Regressions such as (1) by now have some tradition in both the microeconometric as well as in the macro literature. Mace (1991) , Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) were the …rst to suggest regressions similar to (1) on household level data as a test of the null of complete markets. In a world with complete markets, growth in marginal utility should be equated across regions, so that in all states of nature:
where s indexes the state of nature and is the growth rate in the shadow price of consumption. A key implication of (2) In this paper, we wish to explore to what extent U varies across countries depending on whether and to which degree securitization of mortgage related debt is used. Our basic tool will be panel regressions in which we parametrize the coe¢ cient U as a linear function of securitization and of other country-and time-varying controls.so that
where z k t is a vector containing time-varying and country-speci…c characteristics. We partition z k
We then speci…cy a panel risk sharing regression of the form
where k is a country-…xed e¤ect and t a common time e¤ect. Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we use lower-case letters to denote logarithms, so that f c k t = log C k t =C t . Plugging (3) into this regression speci…cation and controlling for …rst-order partial e¤ects we obtain an estimable relation which is
for …nancial globalization, other characteristics of the …nancial system and the housing market etc. In addition, we conduct a number of simulation and sample split exercises. Our result is quite clear cut: 1 is signi…cantly negative -the securitization of mortgage debt seems to be associated with better international risk sharing. Before presenting these results, we describe our data set.
Data
Our sample comprises the following countries with the sample period in Before the introduction of securitization, we assign a value of zero to SEC k t .
From the date when securitization was introduced onwards, SEC k t is assigned a positive value between zero and unity, depending on the degree to which securitization is allowed. Speci…cally, SEC k t is unity for all coun- The year in which securitization was allowed de jure is given in parentheses. In the course of our analysis, we will check whether our securitization indicator could not just pick up other characteristics of national mortgage markets and of the …nancial system more generally. Speci…cally, we look at how mortgage interest rates are set (…xed vs. ‡exible), the possibility for mortgage equity withdrawal, the maximum loan-to-value ratio and the valuation method used (historical property valuation vs. market value method).
For all these mortgage market characteristics we construct dummies, assigning the values provided in table 2 of Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) to the countries in our sample.
An additional robustness check we will perform is to assess the importance of the increase in cross-holdings of foreign assets for our results.
We employ the Milesi-Ferreti (2003, 2007) dataset for this exercise and calculate their measures of …nancial integration based on gross foreign asset and liability positions:
website. We calculate quarterly estimates by linear interpolation of year to year growth rates. As an alternative to the linear interpolation we also calculate quarterly values using our measure of global asset market conditions as a scaling factor for the interpolated trend in gf a and geq.
As measure of swings of global asset prices, we consider short-run variations of the U.S. consumption-wealth ratio that we approximate using Lettau's and Ludvigson's (2001) cay, the residual of a cointegrating relationship between consumption, asset wealth and labor income for the US. Lettau and Ludvigson show that cay is an excellent indicator of asset price cycles in US data. Nitschka (2007) extends this result by showing that cay explains a large share of the variation in asset prices in a cross-section of industrialised economies. We therefore use cay as an indicator of global asset market conditions. The data is freely available on Martin Lettau's website:
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/data/cay_q_07Q4.txt 4 Results Table 1 displays the results from our baseline risk sharing regression: 
for the …rst quartile of countries (low securitization) and the fourth quartile (high securitization). Table 2 Taken together our main …ndings suggest that the securitization of mortgage related risks considerably improves international risk sharing. In the remainder of this paper we assess the robustness of this conclusion further.
Securitization and international …nancial integration
Securitization of mortgage related debt seems to improve international risk sharing, which suggests that it is an important aspect of …nancial globalization. However, this could just be another facet of the secular growth in international gross asset holdings that we have seen since the early/mid 1990s (see Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2007) ). Sørensen et al. (2007) and Artis and Ho¤mann (2008) document that the increase in cross-border asset holdings is echoed in improved international consumption risk sharing.
Since the increase in gross foreign asset holdings worldwide coincides with the period at which securitization has been introduced in various countries in our sample, our securitization indicator could just pick up this trend in …nancial globalization . Not so: we parameterize risk sharing as a function of a …nancial globalization trend
where t denotes a time trend and gf a t = 
Securitization and other characteristics mortgage …nance markets
The structure of mortgage markets di¤ers across countries in many respects.
The degree to which securitization is possible is just one of them. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) distinguish between three di¤erent groups of OECD countries based on di¤erences in the following dimensions: i) the extent to which securitisation of mortgage payments is used, ii) the ‡exibility of mortgage interest rate agreements, iii) the valuation method employed to determine the mortgage lending volume, iv) the maximum loan-to-value ratio and v) the use of mortgage equity withdrawal. A couple of countries that have liquid secondary mortgage backed security markets also allow for mortgage equity withdrawal. On the other hand, countries that do not allow the securitization of mortgage payments also forbid the use of mortgage equity withdrawal etc. Hence, our securitization dummy could re ‡ect one of the other distinguishing features of national mortgage …nance markets.
To alleviate concerns in this respect we take data on mortgage rates ( ‡exible vs. …xed), mortgage equity withdrawal (allowed and used vs. not allowed or nor used), maximum loan to valuation ratio and valuation method (historical prices vs. market valuation) from table 2 in Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) to construct qualitative measures for all of these di¤erent characteristics of mortgage …nance systems just as for securitization. 3 We then parameterize 
Monte Carlo Simulation
Our results that securitization of mortgage debt increases international risk sharing appears robust to a range of controls for …nancial globalization, di¤erences in the …nancial system. However, it is always conceivable that we have neglected other developments that could have a¤ected international risk sharing over the sample period and that our measure of securitization indicator just picks up the cumulative impact of these developments. This could be a concern in particular because, for lack of alternative data, our securitization indicator is necessarily a qualitative one. We therefore conduct a Monte Carlo exercise in which we demonstrate that both the precise timing and the extent to which securitization was allowed matter for our results. In the setup of our experiment, we follow Ho¤mann and Shcherbakova (2008) and randomly assign securitization indicators to countries. Speci…cally, for all 16 countries we draw from the empirical distribution of SEC k t to generate a "placebo" measure of the timing and degree of securitization, SEC P;k t :
We repeat this procedure 1000 times. For each draw, we then perform two checks: …rst, we run the regression
to check in how many cases P 1 would be negative and more signi…cant than the actual SEC k t . Second, we consider both the placebo and the actual securitization indicator jointly and report in how many cases their regression coe¢ cients are individually negative and signi…cant, i.e.
e c k t = 0 g gdp
Panel A of table 5 presents the results when we ask about the signi…cance of the placebo indicator. We see that the coe¢ cient of the placebo securitization measure is negative and more signi…cant than the actual measure in no more than about 1.9% of all cases if taken alone.
Panel B of table 5 displays that when both placebo and actual securitization measure are considered jointly, the placebo measure turns out to be individually negatively signi…cant in roughly 4 percent of all draws while the actual securutization measure is signi…cant in 95 percent of all cases.
These Monte Carlo simulations thus underscore that our results are not the outcome of pure chance: the extent and the timing at which securitization of mortgage debt has been introduced is crucial in order to identify the impact of securitization on international consumption risk sharing. In view of these results it appears highly unlikely that other developments that broadly unfolded in the same way as the use of mortgage securitization can account for the signi…cance of our main results.
Securitization, global asset price cycles and international risk sharing
The notion we have attempted to convey in our analysis is that securitization of mortgage related risks reduces an economy's exposure ( in terms of consumption) to idiosyncratic business cycle shocks. Prima facie, this message seems to be disconnected from the current crisis in international …nancial markets. Policymakers worldwide worry if and to what extent the current swings in global asset prices feed back on the real economy. Furthermore, the trigger of the current crisis were losses on securities that were backed by mortgages to U.S. households with poor or no credit rating.
We make the following remarks: increased international risk sharing inevitably increases the relative importance of global shocks for the volatility of consumption. In fact, the view that securitization of mortgage debt has contributed to turning a national real estate boom into what is the …rst globalized housing bust is not at all inconsistent with our …ndings here. For better or for worse it suggests that securitization does help to share the costs of the crisis internationally.
More immediately relevant for our analysis here is however the possibility that the extent to which international risk sharing is possible could itself be subject to variation over time. If securitization facilitates international risk pooling mainly in tranquil periods but risk sharing becomes all but impossible in periods of severe global turbulence, then the potential macroeconomic bene…ts from securitization could be much smaller than is suggested by our previous results.
We address this concern by asking to what extent risk sharing varies as a function of global asset market conditions. We focus on asset prices as indicator of global asset market conditions. The role of asset price ‡uctua- We therefore use cay as proxy for global asset price movements and parameterize the risk sharing coe¢ cient U (t) as
adding one of the terms on the right hand side at a time. Figure 3 further illustrates this result. Here we plot cay t (dashed line) against the sequence of coe¢ cients U (t) (solid line) obtained from the cross-sectional
where t is the time t speci…c constant. Since U (t) is very noisy, we take a smoothed version using an HP-…lter with smoothness parameter = 6:25.
As is apparent, uninsured consumption risk and cay t move together for most of the sample period (a correlation of 0:46): international risk sharing tends to be high when global asst prices are high and vice versa.
Next we additionally consider the interaction of our securitization dummy with idiosyncratic GDP growth. These estimates, reported in the second line of table 6, convey a clear message. Even if we take account of global asset price ‡uctuations, securitization of mortgage debt still increases international risk sharing signi…cantly and the order of magnitude of the coe¢ cient on SEC k t remains unchanged.
The third line of table 6 provides estimates when we also take account of a possible interaction between asset price movements and securitization.
This speci…cation explicitly allows the sensitivity of risk sharing to global asset market conditions to depend on whether a country has a developed market for securitized mortgage debt. There is no evidence for this. If anything, securitization would seem to lower the dependence of a country's ability to share risk to global asset market conditions -though insigni…-cant, the coe¢ cient 3 is negative. Note also that the coe¢ cient on cay alone, 1 , now also becomes insigni…cant. The relation between global asset price movements as echoed in cay t and international risk sharing essentially breaks down if we also take account of a time trend. In all cases, the securitization coe¢ cient alone, 2 , is virtually unchanged. We conclude from this exercise that international risk sharing does seem to depend on global asset market conditions, increasing in asset price booms and markedly decreasing in downturns. But we do not …nd that countries with more developed markets for securitization are systematically more or less exposed to this phenomenon.
Conclusions
The securitization of mortgage related debt improves international risk sharing because it makes the idiosyncratic risks associated with this debt internationally tradeable. The e¤ect is large: for countries with the most developed secondary markets for mortgage-related debt the volatility of consumption conditional on an idiosyncratic business cycle shocks is betwen 20 and 30
percentage points lower than for countries in which such markets do not exist. We …nd that this result is robust to a range of controls for other aspects of …nancial globalization and that it is independent of international di¤ferences in …nancial systems, other systematic di¤erences in housing and mortgage markets etc.
Against the backdrop of the current crisis our …ndings raise the question whether securitization could not just help pooling risks in tranquil times, leaving the possibility that international risk sharing all but dries up in busts.
Indeed we …nd that the extent to which international risk sharing is possible 
with F A it gross foreign assets of country i at time t and F L it gross foreign liabilities of country i at time t. It thus summarizes the gross foreign asset positions of the countries under study relative to GDP. 
